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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-68 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload 
activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), 
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSME) systems performance during the sixty-fifth flight of the Space Shuttle 
Program and the seventh flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In 
addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated 
ET-65; three SSMEs that were designated as serial numbers 2028,2033, and 2026 
in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-067. 
The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360W040A for the 
left SRB, and 360W040B for the right SRB. 
This STS-68 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle 
Program requirement as documented in NSTS onoo, Volume VIII, Appendix E. The 
requirement that is stated in that document is that each major organizational element 
supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware (and software) 
evaluation and mission performance, plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. 
The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the operations of the 
Space Radar Laboratory-2 (SRL-2). The secondary objectives of the flight were to 
perform the operations of the Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space 
(CHROMEX), the Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG), the Biological 
Research in Canisters (BRIC), the Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor 
(CREAM), the Military Application of Ship Tracks (MAST), and five Get-Away Special 
(GAS) payloads. 
The STS-68 mission was planned with a 10-day duration plus 1 extension day plus 
2 contingency days, which were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter 
contingency operations. The sequence of events for the STS-68 mission is shown in 
Table I, and the Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table II. 
The official Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Problem Tracking List is shown 
in Table III, and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Problem Tracking List is 
shown in Table IV. In addition, the Integration and Payload in-flight anomalies are 
referenced in applicable sections of the report. Appendix A lists the sources of data, 
both formal and informal, that were used in the preparation of this report. Appendix 
B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. All 
times are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as mission elapsed time 
(MET). 
The six-person crew for STS-68 consisted of Michael A. Baker, Capt., U. S. Navy, 
Commander; Terrence W. Wilcutt, Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Pilot; Steven L. Smith, 
Mission SpeCialist 1; Daniel W. Bursch, Cdr., U. S. Navy, Mission Specialist 2; Peter 
J. K. Wisoff, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 3; Thomas D. Jones, Ph. D., Payload 
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Commander and Mission Specialist 4. STS-68 was the third space flight for the 
Commander; the second flight for Mission Specialist 2, Mission Specialist 3, and 
Mission Specialist 4; and the first space flight for the Pilot and Mission Specialist 1. 
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MISSION SUMMARY 
The first launch attempt of the STS-68 mission on August 18, 1994, ended at 
230:10:53:58.157 G.m.t. [1.8 seconds prior to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) ignition], 
when the SSMEs were shut down. SSME 3 high pressure oxidizer turbine (HPOT) 
discharge temperature A exceeded the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) red line of 
1560 oR. As a result, the vehicle was returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building 
(V AB) and all three SSMEs were replaced. 
The second launch attempt of the STS-68 mission resulted in an on-time launch at 
273:11 :16:00.011 G.m.t. (6:16 a.m. c.d.t.) on September 30, 1994, after a countdown 
with no unplanned holds. Main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred at 
273:11 :24:35 G.m.t. (00:00:08:35 MET), after a nominal launch phase. 
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and launch phase 
performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance was as 
expected. SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact occurred as 
antiCipated. Both SRBs were recovered and returned to Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC ) for refurbishment. Performance of the SSMEs, ET, and main propulsion 
system (MPS) was nominal. 
The water spray boiler (WSB) system 2 gaseous nitrogen (GN2) regulator had two 
periods of internal out-of-specification leakage when the isolation valves were 
opened during the prelaunch time-frame. The isolation valves were closed in 
accordance with nominal procedures to decrease the sensitivity of the GN2 tanks to 
internal regulator leakage. This internal leakage did not impact the mission. 
The planned direct-insertion trajectory was flown, and no orbital maneuvering 
subsystem (OMS) -1 maneuver was required. The OMS-2 maneuver was performed 
at 273:11 :51 :09 G.m.t. (00:00:35:09 MET). The maneuver was 99 seconds in 
duration with a!J.V of approximately 160 fVsec, and the orbit achieved was 119.7 by 
119.4 nmi. 
The payload-bay-door (PLBD) opening sequence was completed satisfactorily at 
273:12:49:44 G.m.t. (00:01 :33:44 MET). 
At 273:19:54 G.m.t. (00:08:38 MET), Ku-band channel 2 data (operations recorder 
dump) were degraded because of interference between channels 2 and 3. Ku-band 
channel 3 was active at the time with high-rate data from Space-borne Imaging 
Radar-C (SIR-C) and X-Band SynthetiC Aperture Radar (X-SAR). At 
273:20:18 G.m.t. (00:09:02 MET), channel 2 data were dumped again with nominal 
results. The impact was minimal since channel 2 operations recorder dumps were 
avoided when payload data were being downlinked on channel 3. 
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A 34-minute waste water dump was initiated at 275:05:32 G,m.t. (01:18:16 MET). A 
total of 108.8 Ib of water was dumped in a single dump cycle with no problems. The 
dump rate was a nominal 2.01 percent/minute. 
At approximately 278:04:50 G.m.t. (04:17:34 MET), the crew reported that a tile was 
missing along the inboard aft edge of the port-side overhead window (W8). An 
analysis showed that the loss of this tile would not impact on-orbit or entry 
operations, 
A waste water dump was initiated at 278:02:51 G,m,t. (04:15:35 MET) and was 
completed 45 minutes later without problems. Two cycles were required, and both 
had nominal dump rates of approximately 2.0 percent/minute. A total of 106,5 Ib of 
waste water was dumped. 
At 278:17:59:56 G,m.t. (05:06:43:56 MET), the left aft reaction control system (ReS) 
thruster L5D oxidizer injector temperature became erratic. A thruster-fail message 
was annunciated and the thruster was deselected by the redundancy management 
(RM). A general purpose computer memory (GMEM) WRITE was applied that 
lowered the oxidizer leak detection temperature of the vemier thrusters to 
approximately 0 of, with the fuel leak detection temperature remaining at 130 OF. 
Attitude control was retumed to the vemier thrusters, and the thruster functioned 
nominally for the remainder of the mission. 
Primary RCS thruster L3D failed off after operating successfully for numerous 
pulses. The RCS RM annunciated a fail-off condition when three consecutive 
8o-millisecond firings had chamber pressures of less than 10 psia. There was no 
indication of a leak, and the thruster remained deselected for the remainder of the 
mission, 
The consumables levels remained above the mission plan, and this enabled the 
Mission Management Team (MMT) to fulfill the request of the Payloads Community 
on flight day 6 and extend the mission one day for additional science activities. 
After the flash evaporator system (FES) feedline heater reconfiguration to heater 
system 2 at 278:15:15 G.m.t. (05:04:00 MET), the FES feed line A high-load line 
temperature went off-scale high (>250 OF) for nearly eight hours. The crew switched 
back to heater system 1 at 280:04:14 G.m.t (06:16:59 MET) and all temperature 
conditions became nominal. 
A "BCE STRG 3 MTU" message was annunciated at 279:13:05 G.m.t. 
(06:01 :49 MET). This message indicates a problem in the serial input/output (I/O) 
data path between the master timing unit (MTU) and the general purpose computer 
(GPC), including multiplexer/demultiplexer (MOM) flight critical forward (FF) 3. Two 
good accumulators still existed, and this failure did not impact the flight other than 
the loss of MTU redundancy. 
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A waste water dump was initiated at 280:08:08 G.m.t. (06:20:52 MET) and was 
completed satisfactorily 26 minutes later with no problems. Only one dump cycle 
was required, and the dump rate was nominal with 81.8 Ib of waste water 
dumped. Also, two supply water dumps were successfully performed. The first of 
these dumps was initiated at 281:10:01 G.m.t. (07:22:45 MET) and during the 
30-minute dump, 78.7 Ib of supply water was dumped. The second dump was 
initiated at 282:11 :00 G.m.t. (08:23:44 MET) and during the 30-minute dump, 76.4lb 
of supply water was dumped. 
WSB 1 GN2 regulator pressure decayed slowly throughout the mission. When the 
WSB 1 GN2 isolation valve was opened for entry, the system repressunzed and the 
regulator pressure reached 25.2 psia from the low of 16.8 psi a that had been 
reached. 
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was completed satisfactorily at 
283:12:12:38 G.m.t. (10:00:56:38 MET), and auxiliary power unit (APU) 1 ran for 
4 minutes 16.58 seconds. The APU operated nominally with 15 Ib of fuel used 
during the checkout. Hydraulic system 1 was used in conjunction with APU 1 for the 
checkout, and the system performed nominally. The WSB 1 GN2 isolation valve was 
left closed during the FCS checkout because of the GN2 leak. Had APU 1 required 
spray cooling, the valve would have opened to accommodate spraying; however, the 
APU run-time was not long enough to require any WSB spray cooling of the APU 
lubrication oil. The maximum APU 1 lubrication oil temperature was 202 OF. 
At 283:12:10 G.m.t. (10:00:54 MET), the rudder channel 3 secondary differential 
pressure required approximately 1.96 seconds to increase to the failure-detection 
level (bypass) during the positive-stimulus portion of the secondary-actuator check 
in the FCS checkout procedure. 
A simultaneous supply and waste water dump was performed nominally, with the 
supply dump beginning at 283:13:50 G.m.t. (10:01:34 MET). A total of 40.1 Ib of 
supply water was dumped from tanks B, C, and 0 during the 16-minute dump. The 
waste water dump was initiated 12 minutes into the supply water dump at 
283:14:02 G.m.t. (10:02:46 MET), and a total of 126.91b of waste water was dumped 
during the 39-minute dump. 
All stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in preparation for entry. The 
payload bay doors were successfully closed and latched at 284:12:06:13 G.m.t. 
(11 :00:50:13 MET). The first landing opportunity was waved off because of the 
dynamic weather at KSC that was trending toward unacceptable landing conditions. 
A decision was made to land at Edwards Air Force Base, and the deorbit maneuver 
was initiated at 284:16:07:19 G.m.t. (11 :04:51 :19 MET), and the maneuver was 
138.5 seconds in duration with a AV of 239.1 fVsec. 
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Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred at the 
Edwards Air Force Base concrete runway 22 at 284:17:02:08 G.m.t. 
(11 :05:46:08 MET) on October 11, 1994. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed 
satisfactorily at 284:17:02:11 G.m.t., and nose landing gear touchdown occurred 
10 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at 284:17:02:45 G.m.t., with wheels 
stop occurring at 284:17:03:10 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The 
flight duration was 11 days 05 hours 46 minutes 08 seconds. 
The WSB 3 GN2 regulator pressure was noted to be decreaSing at a rate of 
0.26 psVminute beginning at 284:17:18:41 G.m.t., about 16 minutes after landing. 
The postlanding video also showed what appeared to be water dripping from the 
area of the centerline latch for the OrbiterlET doors. The postlanding inspection 
determined the source of this water to be WSB 3. 
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PAYLOADS 
The Space Radar Laboratory -2 (SRL-2) consisted of a set of dedicated Earth 
observation payloads that were used to study vegetation. hydrology. tectonics. 
topography. and global air pollution. The SRL-2 payload is comprised of the Space-
bome Imaging Radar-C/x-Band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SIR-C/x-SAR). and the 
Measurement of Air Pollution from Satellite (MAPS). These are the same 
instruments flown on STS-59 as the SRL-1 payload. Other payloads flown on 
STS-68 include the Biological Research in Canister (BRIC). the Military Applications 
in Ship Tracks (MAST). the Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG). the 
Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space Experiment (CHROMEX). and the 
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM). 
SPACE RADAR LABORATORY - 2 
The imaging radar included in the SIR-C/x-SAR instruments provided the capability 
to obtain radar data over virtually any region of the Earth. regardless of weather or 
sunlight conditions. The SRL-2 flight was planned as a 1 D-day +2 day mission on a 
57-degree inclination. However. energy conservation measures added the capability 
for another day to the mission. and this extra day was added to the mission at the 
request of the Scientific Community. As a result. the mission was 11 days in 
duration. 
The SRL-2 instruments performed exceptionally well throughout the mission. The 
SIR-C performed flawlessly from the beginning as did the X-SAR. The Payload High 
Rate Recorders (PHRRs) performed acceptably. even though PHRR-1 was removed 
and replaced with an on-orbit spare after the Original recorder failed to play-back 
properly. It is expected that some of the data tapes recorded on PHRR-1 
immediately prior to the detection of the problem will not provide useful data. 
The Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) sub-experiment also performed flawlessly and 
was a complete success. The radar experiments overall had a success rate of about 
98.5 percent successful data takes against those attempted. For the supersites 
alone. the success rate was almost 99 percent. The strategy to follow a pre-mission 
planned ground track was executed so well that the last radar data takes occurred 
within one-half minute of the pre-mission predicted mission elapsed time and the 
look angle of the radar changed less than 0.5 degree from the pre-mission plan. In 
addition. the zero doppler steering maneuvers appear to have been very successful. 
The SIR-C/x-SAR instruments produced over 110 hours of radar data that were 
written on 163 SIR-C and 36 X-SAR digital data tapes on the three PHRRs. During 
the 950 data-takes. the area of coverage was in excess of 83 million square 
kilometers. The total data-take swath length was two million kilometers (all data-take 
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swaths summed as a contiguous data take). The APL experiment produced wave 
spectra over 1 million linear kilometers of ocean. 
The high-rate downlink and subsequent flow to the Mission Control Center (MCC) 
and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) worked very well. The JPL ground products 
system processed approximately 40 scenes using the high-precision processor, 
three scenes using data from all three frequencies and numerous special products. 
X-SAR processed numerous X-band passes on the real-time processor and 
produced special image products for display and evaluation. 
One of the bonuses of flying SIR-C/x-SAR for the second time was the opportunity 
to demonstrate a different data-gathering method called interferometry from the 
Shuttle platform. Scientists conducted the highly successful interferometry 
experiments during the last three days of the flight. The Scientists were able to 
generate digital elevation models (topography) of the Earth's surface. Fringes were 
found in scenes taken from the SRL-1 flight in April and the SRL-2 flight, as well as 
scenes taken on successive days during the SRL-2 mission. Changes in topography 
were found in Long Valley Caldera, California, and in Kilauea, Hawaii. Topographic 
maps were also produced of Mammoth Mountain, California. A digital elevation map 
(OEM) and a perspective image were produced for Mt. Etna in Sicily from the repeat-
pass data. 
The MAPS instrument performed flawlessly, as it did on the STS-59 mission. The 
experimenters were again extremely pleased with the stability of the thermal control 
loop, given the sun angles at the time of year that this mission was flown. The 
MAPS experiment was 100-percent successful and the data quality was excellent. 
At the conclusion of the mission, 256 hours of MAPS data had been accumulated, 
and it covered all of the planned correlative measurement sites. These data were 
enhanced by an excellent set of crew observations. 
CHROMOSOME AND PLANT CELL DIVISION IN SPACE EXPERIMENT 
STS-68 was the fifth flight of the CHROMEX experiments that examined the effects 
of microgravity on a wide range of physiological processes in plants. The 
experiment operations are flown in an automated plant growth unit, which is located 
on the Shuttle rniddeck. The crew performed daily status checks of the unit and it 
performed nominally throughout the flight. 
COMMERCIAL PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH EXPERIMENT 
The CPCG experiment grew and retrieved crystals in microgravity as well as 
provided data on the dynamics of protein crystallization. The CPCG was activated at 
273:18:05 G.m.t. (00:06:49 MET), and the timeline sequence was initiated 
40 minutes later. Early in the mission, the commercial refrigeratorlincubator module 
(CRIM) temperature was elevated because of higher-than-expected cabin 
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temperatures. After the cabin temperatures retumed to expected levels, the CRIM 
temperature stabilized and remained at that level throughout the remainder of the 
mission. The end of the mission timeline sequence was deleted at 284:04:27 G.m.t. 
(10:17:11 MET), and CPCG preparations for entry were completed seven minutes 
later. 
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN CANISTERS EXPERIMENT 
STS-68 was the first flight of the BRIC experiment which provided data in the area of 
life sciences. The BRIC hardware is self-contained and requires neither Orbiter 
power nor any crew interface. Postflight evaluation is required to determine the 
success of the BRIC experiment. 
COSMIC RADIATION EFFECTS AND ACTIVATION MONITOR EXPERIMENT 
The CREAM experiment collected data on cosmic ray energy loss spectra, neutron 
fluxes, and induced radioactivity using active and passive monitors. The CREAM 
monitor was activated at 273:18:41 G.m.t. (00:07:25 MET), and the passive monitors 
were placed around the cabin about two minutes later. The crew moved the active 
monitor to the station 1 position at 275:13:01 G.m.t. (02:01 :45 MET). It was then 
moved to the station 2 position at 2n:18:42 G.m.t. (04:07:26 MET), to station 1 at 
279:16:27 G.m.t. (06:05:11 MET), and to station 1 again at 281 :20:18 G.m.t. 
(08:09:02 MET). The CREAM active monitor was stowed at 282:16:21 G.m.t. 
(09:05:05 MET), and the passive monitors were stowed prior to entry. 
MILITARY APPUCATIONS OF SHIP TRACKS EXPERIMENT 
The MAST experiment collected data on ship pollutants and their effects on the 
reflective properties of clouds. No MAST opportunities were scheduled in the 
preflight timeline, as MAST targets are dependent upon weather conditions. 
Upcoming MAST opportunities were submitted to the Flight Control team on each 
planning shift as agreed upon prior to flight. The crew reported completing nine 
MAST opportunities that included the Kamchatka peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk, and 
the California coast. 
GETAWAY SPECIALS 
The GAS payloads consisted of seven experiments flown in three GAS canisters. 
The experiments were: 
a. G-316 - One experiment provided data on the Effects of Microgravity on 
Survival, Mating, and Development of Milkweed Bug, and the second experiment 
provided data on the Microgravity Effects on Growth Quality and Size of Crystal of 
Rochelle Salt. The GAS canister G-316 was verified to be activated at 
278:20:19 G.m.t. (05:09:03 MET). The G-316 canister was also powered down on 
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flight day 12, as planned, for entry. The sponsor of this GAS canister is the contact 
for the results of this experiment. 
b. G-503 - The G-503 canister contained four experiments, which were: 
1. Microgravity and Cosmic Radiation Effects on Diatoms; 
2. Concrete Curing in Microgravity; 
3. Root Growth in Space; and 
4. Microgravity Corrosion. 
The G-503 GAS canister was verified to be activated at 273:20:11 G.m.t. 
(00:08:55 MET). Entry preparation activities were completed as planned on flight 
day 12. The sponsor of this GAS canister is the contact for the results of this 
experiment. 
c. G-541 - The Study of Breakdown of Planar SolidlLiquid Interface during 
Crystal Growth - This experiment was commanded on at 273:20:19:35 G.m.t., and 
commanded off at 274:17:57:32 G.m.t. (01 :06:41 :32 MET). The sponsor is the 
contact for results of this experiment. 
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
An attempt was made to launch this vehicle on August 18, 1994; however, the 
launch was aborted at 230:10:53:59.157 G.m.t. As a result, the Space Vehicle was 
taken from the launch pad back to the VAB where the three main engines were 
changed. The successful launch of the STS-68 mission occurred at 
273:11 :16:00.011 G.m.t. on September 30, 1994. This section of the report 
discusses the launch abort as well as the flight. 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER 
Launch Abort 
The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal for the launch attempt on August 18, 
1994. There were no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) violations. One 
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and SpeCification Document (OMRSD) 
violation occurred when the left-hand System A Range Safety battery temperature 
dropped off-scale low. All other SRB systems performed as expected during the 
launch attempt. 
Launch 
All SRB systems performed nominally during the launch of the STS-68 vehicle. The 
countdown was normal and no SRB LCC or OMRSD violations occurred. For this 
flight, the low-pressure heated ground purge of the SRB aft skirt was used to 
maintain the case/nozzle jOint temperatures within the required LCC ranges. At 
T -25 minutes, the purge was activated at high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt. 
One SRB-related in-flight anomaly occurred in conjunction with this flight. The 
left-hand SRB range safety system (RSS) throwaway cable assembly, which is used 
during ground test of the RSS, was found to have cuts in the cable jacket (Flight 
Problem STS-68-K-1). This anomaly has been assigned to the Kennedy Space 
Center for resolution. 
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the ET at T + 123.96 seconds, and 
visual sighting reports from the recovery area indicate that the deceleration 
subsystems performed as designed. Both SRBs were observed during descent and 
after landing, both were observed floating approximately 15 miles from the retrieval 
ships. 
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REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR 
Launch Abort 
No RSRM Lee or OMRSD violations were identified during the launch abort 
countdown. Power up and operation of all igniter and field-joint heaters was 
accomplished nominally. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable 
limits throughout the countdown. 
Launch 
No RSRM Lee or OMRSD violations occurred during the launch countdown. Power 
up and operation of the igniter and field-joint heaters was accomplished nominally. 
All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the 
countdown. 
Field joint heaters operated for 11 hours 25 minutes (23 hours total including the 
launch abort). Power was applied to the heating element an average of 15 percent 
of the time during the Lee time-frame to maintain required temperature levels. 
Igniter joint heaters operated for 18 hours 19 minutes (36 hours 9 minutes total 
including launch abort). Power was applied to the igniter heating elements an 
average of 29 percent of the Lee time frame to maintain proper temperatures. 
The aft skirt thermal conditioning was operated periodically to maintain the flex 
bearing temperature above 60 OF and the nozzle-to-case joint temperature above 
75 OF. To ensure all hazardous/combustible gases were removed from the aft 
compartment, the aft skirt purge was operated at high flow-rate from T -15 minutes 
through launch. 
Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMs was well within the contract 
end item (eEl) specification limits, and was typical of the performance observed on 
previous flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature was 80 OF. The table 
on the following page presents the more detailed propulsion performance data for 
the RSRMs. 
All available data were recorded, transmitted and analyzed, and no in-flight 
anomalies were identified from the data review. The postflight inspection of the 
motors also indicated nominal performance, with all joints performing as designed. 
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RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE 
Parameter Left motor, 80 of Right motor, 80 of 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
Impulse gates 
1-20, 106 Ibf-sec 66.12 65.92 66.06 65.90 
1-60, 106 Ibf-sec 176.05 175.70 175.90 175.n 
I-AT 106 Ibf-sec 296.93 297.16 296.90 296.60 
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-secllbm 268.6 267.9 268.6 268.3 
Bum rate, in/sec @ 60 of 0.3678 0.3685 0.3676 0.3682 
at 625 psia 
Bum rate, in/sec @ 80 of 0.3731 0.3738 0.3729 0.3735 
at 625 psia 
Event times, seconds 1 
Ignition interval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A 
Webtime2 108.9 108.8 109.0 108.6 
Separation cue, 50 pSia 118.6 118.4 118.7 118.5 
Action time2 120.7 120.6 120.8 120.5 
Se~aration command 123.6 123.4 123.6 123.4 
PMBT, of 80 80 80 80 
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A 
psial10 ms 
Decay time, seconds 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 
(59.4 psia to 85 K) 
TaUoff Imbalance Impulse Predicted Actual 
differential Klbf-sec N/A 202.0 
Impulse Imbalance = left motor minus right motor 
1 All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a 2 • 
2 Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval). 
EXTERNAL TANK 
Launch Abort 
All objectives and requirements associated with ET propellant loading were met. All 
ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. ET purge and 
heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No ET LCC or 
OMRSD violations occurred. 
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown. There 
was no ice or frost observed on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of 
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ice anellor frost were present on the liquid oxygen (L02) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) 
feed lines and on the pressurization line brackets. All observations were acceptable 
per NSTS 08303. The IcelFrost Red Team was not used because of a recent 
change to the LCC. The Debris team reported nothing unusual on the ET. The ET 
pressurization system functioned nominally throughout engine start. 
Launch 
The ET loading and flight performance was excellent. All flight objectives were 
accomplished. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated properly. 
All ET purge and heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No 
ET LeC or OMRSD violations occurred. 
The nose cone purge heater and temperature control system operated satisfactorily. 
Measured nose cone flow-rate was within the Interface Control Document (ICD) 
requirements, as it has been since KSC installed a critical flow nozzle to limit the 
flow rate. 
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown. There 
was no ice or frost observed on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of 
ice anellor frost were present on the L02 and LH2 feed lines and on the 
pressurization line brackets, and some frost or ice was present along the LH2 
protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. All observations were acceptable per NSTS 
08303. The IcelFrost Red Team reported that no anomalous thermal protection 
system (TPS) conditions existed, although one acceptable crack did exist at the 
foam bridge between the vertical strut cable tray and its fitting and that was caused 
by joint rotation. 
Propellant tank loading was nominal. All L02 and LH2 tank ullage pressures were 
within acceptable limits throughout loading, prepressurization, and flight. Geyser 
prevention procedures provided excellent temperature margins throughout loading. 
The ET pressurization system functioned nominally throughout engine start and 
flight. The minimum L02 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage-pressure 
slump was 14.2 psid. 
ET separation occurred when commanded. ET entry and breakup occurred 17 nmi. 
up range of the preflight prediction and within the expected footprint. 
Postflight analysis of the film from the umbilical well cameras, as well as from the 
on board camera operated by the crew in support of Development Test Objective 
(DTO) 312, revealed the following: 
1. Two divots, approximately 10 to 12 inches in diameter, in or just forward of 
the LH~to-intertank splice on the -Z side of the ET; 
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2. A shallow divot, approximately 5 inches in diameter, in the LH2 insulation 
aft of the intertank splice and outboard of the -Y bipod attachment. 
3. Missing foam, approximately 10 inches in length, with probable exposed 
primer from an intertank stringer top near the +Z axis at approximately station 
XT-1050. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 
Launch Abort 
All SSME parameters appeared to be normal throughout the prelaunch countdown, 
and the parameters were typical of the prelaunch parameters observed on previous 
flights. Engine ready was achieved at the proper time and all LCC were met. An on-
pad abort occurred at 230:10:53:58.157 G.m.t. because the SSME 3 (SIN 2032) high 
pressure oxidizer turbine (HPOT) discharge temperature channel A exceeded a pre-
liftoff redline check resulting in a failure identification (FlO) and subsequent engine 
shutdown (Flight Problem STS-68-E-01) From engine start command (ESC) plus 
2.3 seconds through ESC plus 5.8 seconds, the HPOT discharge temperature must 
not exceed 1560 oR. The SSME-3 HPOT discharge temperature Channel A attained 
1576 oR. The Channel B measurement attained 1530 OR, and that was also higher 
than predicted. Data review indicates that the data are valid. 
SSME 3 was commanded to shut down at ESC plus 4.72 seconds. SSME 2 and 
SSME 1 subsequently shut down at ESC plus 5.80 seconds and 6.96 seconds, 
respectively. The shut downs were all nominal and placed the vehicle in a safe 
configuration. 
The SSME 1 inspection following the abort revealed a crack in the turbine discharge 
sheet metal tumaround duct of the SSME 1 high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) 
(Flight Problem STS-68-E-Q2). The crack was 4.5 inches long, with two cracks 
(0.8 inch and 0.9 inch long) running 90 degrees to the long crack, making a flap. 
The flap was deflected outboard touching the coolant liner. Degradation of the 
turbine performance would be small from this condition, and the engine is tolerant to 
particle generation of this size in this area. 
Launch 
All SSME parameters were normal throughout the countdown and were typical of 
prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine ready was achieved at 
the proper time, all LCC were met, and an on-time start and thrust buildup were 
normal. 
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, shutdown, 
and propellant dumping operations was normal. The specific impulse (Isp) was 
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rated at 452.0 seconds. High pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and HPFTP 
temperatures were well within specification throughout engine operation. MECO 
occurred at T + 513.4 seconds. There were no FIDs or significant problems identified 
from the data. 
A review of the launch data has revealed the following items of interest: 
1. The SSME 1 HPOTP discharge temperature channel A shifted down at 
engine start plus 240 seconds. The shift is attributed to a reduction in HPOTP 
cavitation. This same condition was observed on STS-59 (previous flight of this 
pump) and is within the experience base. 
2. The SSME 1 anti-flood valve skin temperature 2 failed high at engine start 
plus 95 seconds, and the no. 1 measurement was slow to respond. The most 
probable cause is that the sensors are debonded. The sensors will be replaced 
prior to the next flight of this engine. 
3. The SSME 1 main combustion chamber (MCC) pressure channel A 1 
spiked to 84 psia at engine start plus 292 seconds. This was a single event spike 
and caused the channel to be temporarily disqualified for one major cycle. Even 
though the sensor operated properly for the remainder of the flight, it was removed 
and troubleshooting was performed. Microfocus X-ray identified a particle inside the 
sensor that could account for the spike. The sensor has been sent to the vendor for 
additional analysis. 
4. The SSME 2 MCC hot gas injection pressure froze and recovered at 
engine start plus 270 seconds. This condition was within past experience. 
5. The SSME 2 HPOTP system pressure dipped at engine cutoff plus 
2.5 seconds. This condition is within the experience base. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
Launch Abort 
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as 
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices 
were armed and system inhibits tumed off at the appropriate times. All SRSS 
measurements indicated that the system operated throughout the launch abort 
countdown as expected with the exception of the left-hand System A battery 
temperature. The System A battery temperature dropped off-scale low (18 OF). An 
exception was written to the OMRSD requirement of 34.6 to 103.4 OF. All SRSS 
devices performed as planned for the on-pad launch abort. 
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Analysis of the battery temperature problem indicates that the measurement failed 
as a step-function, indicating an instrumentation failure. Voltage and current 
remained stable during the measurement failure. The failure signature indicates an 
intermittent open circuit for the temperature measurement (thermistor). The battery 
was removed and tests were performed to isolate the cause of the anomaly. 
Launch 
The SRSS closed-loop testing was completed as scheduled during the launch 
countdown. All SRSS S&A devices were armed and system inhibits turned off at the 
proper time. All SRSS measurements indicated that the system operated as 
expected throughout the countdown and flight. 
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was turned 
off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from 
the Orbiter. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS 
Main Propulsion System 
Launch Abort: The overall performance of the MPS was as expected throughout the 
countdown and during engine start and shutdown. The L02 and LH2 loading was 
performed nominally with no stop-flows or reverts. No OMRSD or Lee violations 
occurred. 
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas 
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the 
Orbiter aft compartment occurred shortly after start of fast-fill and was approximately 
153 ppm, and that compares favorably with previous data for this vehicle. 
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus the 
inventory loads results in a loading accuracy of -0.026 percent for LH2 and 
+0.035 percent for L02. 
Launch: The overall performance of the MPS was nominal. No Lee or OMRSD 
violations occurred. 
LH2 loading operations were normal throughout the prelaunch time-frame and were 
performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. Analysis of the LH2 loading 
system data showed the load to be 231,886 Ibm at the end of replenish. A 
comparison with the planned load showed that an excess of 33 Ibm was loaded, 
providing a loading accuracy of +0.01 percent, which is well within the required 
accuracy. 
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L02 loading operations were nonnal throughout the prelaunch time-frame and were 
perfonned without any stop-flows or reverts. Analysis of the L02 loading system 
data showed the load to be 1,388,337 Ibm at the end of replenish. A comparison 
with the planned load showed that an excess of 508 Ibm was loaded, providing a 
loading accuracy of +0.04 percent, which is well within the required accuracy. 
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas 
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the 
Orbiter aft compartment was approximately 150 ppm, and that compares favorably 
with previous data for this vehicle. 
Ascent MPS perfonnance was completely nominal and no anomalies were identified. 
Data indicate that the L~ and LH2 pressurization systems perfonned as planned, 
and that all net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout 
the flight. The gaseous hydrogen flow control valves perfonned nominally. 
The MPS gaseous oxygen (G02) pressurization system failed the OMRSD File IX 
requirement for on-orbit decay. A detennination of the amount of leakage from the 
oxygen pressurization system is made by measuring the pressure decay of the G02 
manifold following manifold pressurization. The calculated on-orbit leakage was 
34.8 scim, and the allowable leakage is 24.5 scim. Failure of this requirement will 
necessitate the perfonnance of the G02 pressurization leakage check per the 
OMRSD File III to isolate the cause of the leakage. 
The propellant dump and vacuum inerting operations were perfonned under the 
01-22 software in a nominal manner. The propellant dump was initiated at 
MEeO plus 122 seconds as planned, and the postflight analysis indicated nominal 
operations. The vacuum inerting was also nominal. This was the last flight of the 
01-22 software. 
In preparation for entry, the manifold repressurization was nominal. A total of 
57.51b of helium (nominal), was used during entry on this vehicle. 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
The ReS perfonnance was nominal; however, two anomalies were identified from 
the data. The ReS was interconnected to the left and right OMS, and during the 
interconnect operations the ReS used a total of 2533 Ibm of OMS propellants. In 
addition, 4658.8 Ibm of RCS propellants were consumed by the RCS. 
During this flight, a successful attempt was made to obtain high-rate data on all ReS 
thrusters so that the ReS hot-fire prior to entry could be eliminated. All thrusters 
except F3F were verified with high-rate chamber pressure data. Since this thruster 
was not a high-priority thruster for entry, the ReS hot-fire was eliminated. 
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At 278:17:59:56 G.m.t. (05:06:43:56 MET), the left aft RCS thruster L5D oxidizer 
injector temperature became erratic (Flight Problem STS-68-V-02). A fuel leak 
message was annunciated and the thruster was deselected by the RM. Flight rules 
prohibit vernier operation with a vemier thruster deselected; consequently, the 
primary thrusters were used for vehicle attitude control. Data analYSis showed that 
the data signature was typical of an intermittent open instrumentation sensor or 
wiring, most likely between the sensor and dedicated signal conditioner. A 
temporary workaround was implemented that allowed vemier operations only when 
real-time telemetry downlink of the L5D fuel injector temperature and chamber 
pressure (Pc) were available, and with data losses of no greater than 30 seconds. 
Subsequently, a more permanent workaround was implemented after verification in 
the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) in which a GMEM WRITE was 
applied. The GMEM lowered the oxidizer leak detection temperature of the vernier 
thrusters to approximately 0 of, with the fuel leak detection temperature remaining at 
130 of. Leak detection for all vemier thrusters was provided by the fuel injector 
temperature. Attitude control was retumed to the vemier thrusters, and the thruster 
functioned nominally for the remainder of the mission. 
At approximately 279:05:00 G.m.t. (05:17:44 MET), the left aft primary RCS thruster 
L3D was declared failed off and deselected by the RM after having been 
successfully fired 399 times. The failure occurred after three consecutive 80 ms 
pulses during which the chamber pressure never reached more than 10 psia (Flight 
Problem STS-68-V-03). There was no indication of a leak, and the thruster 
remained deselected for the remainder of the mission. Data review indicates that 
the thruster did not fire nominally. Injector thermal trends indicate propellant flow 
through both valves, but the data did not show the typical soak-back that is indicative 
of a nominal firing. Inertial measurement unit (IMU) vehicle rate data confirm low 
thrust output for the L3D firings. 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The OMS performed nominally during the mission, completing two maneuvers -
OMS-2 and the deorbit firing. The total firing time on the engines was 
236.3 seconds, with 12,314 Ibm of propellants being used. In addition, the ReS 
used 2533 Ibm of the OMS propellants. Details of the two OMS firings are shown in 
the following table. 
OMS FIRINGS 
Firing !!lV, 
OMS firing Engine Time, G.m.tJMET duration, tVsec 
seconds 
OMS-2 Both 273:11 :51 :09:9 G.m.t. 98.0 160.1 
00:00:35:09.9 MET 
Deorbit Both 284:16:07:19.3 G.m.t. 138.3 239.2 
11 :04:51 :19.3 MET 
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Two minor problems were noted, neither of which affected the mission. The first 
was the left fuel total quantity meter reading high. The aft probe was reading 
correctly; however, the forward probe was not. The problem has been documented 
at KSC; however, corrective action will probably not be taken until this vehicle goes 
to Orbiter maintenance down period (OMDP). 
Also, the right oxidizer total quantity reading was high. The aft probe was reading 
approximately the same value as total quantity. Preliminary analysis indicates that 
the aft probe and its electronics are suspect. This problem was initially noted on 
STS-59, and KSC documented it at that time for future corrective action. 
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem 
The operations of the power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem 
was nominal. A total of 3,061 Ibm of oxygen was used, including 128 Ibm that was 
consumed by the environmental control subsystems. Also, 369 Ibm of hydrogen 
were used. Reactants remaining provided a miSSion extension capability of 54 hours 
at a mission average power level of 15.8 kW. There were no anomalies identified 
from the data for this subsystem. 
At 280:03:16 G.m.t. (06:16:00 MET), usage was switched to hydrogen tanks 1 and 2 
for the next 36 hours. During most of the cycles for the first 12 hours following the 
switch to tanks 1 and 2, hydrogen tank 2 pressure rose faster than the tank 1 
pressure and manifold pressures when the heaters were on. This condition 
indicated that the hydrogen tank 2 check valve was sticking closed. However, the 
tank 2 pressure declined normally during the heater-off cycle, and this indicates that 
the check valve was opening enough to allow some flow and properly deplete the 
tank but not enough to increase manifold pressure. Similar behavior was noted for 
this same hydrogen tank 2 check valve during the previous flight of the OV-105 
vehicle (STS-59). At 280:18:56 G.m.t. (07:07:40 MET), the manifold pressure 
abruptly rose approximately 8 psi from the tank 1 pressure to the tank 2 pressure. 
This indicated that the hydrogen tank 2 check valve suddenly opened or became 
unstuck. After this occurrence, hydrogen tanks 1 and 2 and the manifold pressures 
all tracked each other properly for the rest of the mission. There was no mission 
impact from this condition. 
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem 
The fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem performed nominally throughout the 
mission with no problems or anomalies identified in the data. The fuel cells 
generated 4,260 kWh of electricity at an average power level of 15.8 kW and the 
load was 516 amperes. The fuel cells consumed 2933 Ibm of oxygen and 369 Ibm of 
hydrogen, and generated 3302 Ibm of water during the mission. 
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Main buses Band C were tied for most of the mission to support the payload. Five 
fuel cell purges were performed, occurring at approximately 24, 91, 163, 212, and 
261 hours mission elapsed time. For this mission, the mean purge interval was only 
59 hours. No purge interval of 96 hours was achieved because of the higher 
average load that led to a more rapid performance decay. 
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem 
The APU subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout the mission with no 
problems or anomalies identified from the data. The APUs were shut down after 
ascent in the 2, 1, and 3 order to fulfill the requirements of DTO 414, Sequence B. 
The results of the DTO are discussed in the Development Test Objectives section of 
this report. 
During the scrubbed launch attempt, the APU 2 exhaust gas temperature (EGT) 1 
rose sharply at start-up, then followed a normal profile but was biased high. This 
same behavior was also noted during the ascent and entry phases of the mission, 
but to a lesser extent. 
All three APUs had the new water valves installed for their first flight. These valves 
are not life-limited because of corrosion. The previous design was subject to 
corrOSion, which caused the bellows to stick open or closed; hence the valves were 
limited to a nine-month wetted life. 
The APU 1 gearbox lubrication (lube) oil outlet temperature fault detection and 
annunciation (FDA) limit was lowered to provide an FDA message early and allow 
sufficient time for the crew to open the WSB GN2 isolation valve that is opened for 
normal lubrication oil COOling operations (250 OF) during FeS checkout. However, 
opening the valve was not required. 
The APU fuel consumption and run-time by APU position and serial number is 
shown in the following table. 
APU 1 (SIN 403) APU2 (SIN 311) APU3 (SIN 410) 
Flight phase 
Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel 
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, 
Ib Ib Ib 
Ascent 19:00 48 18:44 48 19:12 48 
FCS checkout 04:16 15 
Entrv- 59:52 116 74:32 141 59:56 116 
Totalb 83:08 179 93:16 189 79:08 164 
aAPUs ran for approximately 14 minutes 47 seconds after main gear touchdown. 
~otals do not include 5 minutes 53 seconds of operation during the launch abort. 
Each APU consumed 18 Ibm of fuel during the launch abort operation. 
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Hydraullcs/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem 
The hydraulicsIWSB subsystem met all requirements placed on the system; however 
several minor problems were noted. 
During prelaunch operations, nominal performance was observed except for out-of-
specification intemalleakage on WSB system 2 GN2 regulator after opening the GN2 
isolation valve during the prelaunch activities (Flight Problem STS-68-V-06). The 
first regulator leakage was about 42 seem (redline limit is 10 seem) over a 26-minute 
period following the first isolation valve opening. The second leakage was 
approximately 73 seem over a 28-minute period just prior to launch. The isolation 
valves were closed whenever possible in accordance with nominal procedures to 
decrease the sensitivity of the GN2 tanks to internal regulator leakage. Internal 
leakage has been observed in the past to be caused by a damaged balance stem 
O-ring. 
The ascent operation of the hydraulics subsystem was nominal, and the 
performance of two of the three WSB systems was nominal. WSB system 3 
exhibited a 24.5 OF APU lubrication oil overcool subsequent to spray start. This 
overcool is believed to have been caused by a slight freeze-up of the WSB spray 
bar. 
On-orbit operation of the hydraulicsIWSB subsystem was nominal except for WSB 1 
GN2 regulator which exhibited a low-pressure decay in regulator outlet pressure 
through the relief valve (Flight Problem STS-68-V-07). The decay began at 
274:14:35 G.m.t. (01:03:19 MET) and continued for the remainder ofthe flight. 
HydraulicsIWSB system 1 was used for FCS checkout; however, no spray cooling 
was required because of the short run-time of the APU (4 minutes 16.58 seconds). 
The GN2 isolation valve was kept closed during the FCS checkout to prevent loss of 
water because the regulator outlet pressure decay may have been due to water leak. 
The pressure decayed to 16.8 psi a prior to entry; however, thIS WSB operated 
nominally throughout entry and landing. 
At 283:12:10 G.m.t. (10:00:54 MET), the rudder channel 3 secondary differential 
pressure required approximately 1.96 seconds to increase to the failure-detectIon 
level (bypass) during the positive-stimulus portion of the secondary-actuator check 
in the FCS checkout procedure (Flight Problem STS-68-V-11). The channel should 
normally bypass in approximately 120 ms. The channel bypassed nominally during 
the negative-stimulus portion of the test. Data review showed a delay of 
1.44 seconds on STS-59, less than one second on STS-57, less than 0.25 second 
on STS-54, and 0.15 second on STS-49. There were no delays apparent on STS-47 
or STS-61. 
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During entry, the hydraulics subsystem performed satisfactorily. WSB system 1 
performed nominally. WSB system 2 exhibited a maximum intemalleakage of 
approximately 22 sccm after the GN2 isolation valve was opened for entry. 
The WSB 3 system 3 regulator pressure showed a rapid decay shortly after weight-
on-wheels (WOW), indicating a leak (Flight Problem STS-68-V-10). This WSB had 
been stable throughout the mission. The GN2 pressure dropped from 38.1 psia to 
19.8 psia in just over one hour. Water was observed coming from the ET umbilical 
doors and centerline hinge while still on the runway. Total water leakage in to the aft 
compartment was estimated to be 881b (10.5 gallons). Approximately 0.5 Ib of water 
remained in the tank. The postflight inspection revealed that the WSB 3 bottom and 
port side blankets were wet. System 3 was repressurized by cycling the GN2 
isolation valve during troubleshooting to pinpoint the leak. The water leak was 
isolated to a crack in the WSB system 3 APU lubrication oil spray valve on the inlet 
side. It has been determined that the crack resulted from contaminant that was 
introduced into the system, and the contaminant produced corrosion. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem 
The performance of the electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem 
was nominal throughout the mission with no problems or anomalies identified in the 
data. All data analyzed showed nominal voltage and current signatures, and no 
specified limits were violated during the mission. 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) met all requirements of 
the mission in a satisfactory manner. 
The active thermal control subsystem (ATCS) operation was nominal throughout the 
mission. After the FES feed line heater reconfiguration to heater system 2 at 
278:15:15 G.m.t. (05:04:00 MET), the FES feedline A high-load line temperature 
went off-scale high (>250 OF) for nearly eight hours (Flight Problem STS-68-V-05). 
The FES feedline A accumulator line temperature measurement had been 
experiencing erratic cycling during the off-scale high periods and had maintained 
temperatures above the nominal thermostat control band. The heater on this line is 
controlled by the same thermostat as the heater on the high-load line, and it is 
possible that the heater system 2 thermostat is loose. The off-scale high condition 
was also repeated for shorter periods (1 to 3 hours), a signature that also occurred 
during STS-59. The crew switched back to heater system 1 at 280:04:14 G.m.t 
(06: 16:58 MET) and all temperature conditions became nominal. 
The ATCS successfully supported the payload cooling requirements by placing both 
Freon coolant loops (FCLs) to the payload mode at 273:13:29 G.m.t. 
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(00:02:13 MET). The FCLs were returned to the interchanger mode at 
284:06:13 G.m.t. (10:18:57 MET). 
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus 
15 minutes when ammonia system B, which used the primary/GPC controller, was 
activated. Ammonia system B was deactivated after 17 minutes of operation when 
ground cooling was connected and placed in operation. 
The supply water and waste management systems performed normally throughout 
the mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and overboard 
dump systems. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 
66 and 100 OF with the operation of the line heater. Three supply water dumps were 
made at an average dump rate of 1.59 percent/minute (2.9 Ib/min). 
Waste water was gathered at about the predicted rate. Four waste water dumps 
were made at an average dump rate of 1.9 percent/minute (3.13Ib/min). The waste 
water dump line temperature was maintained between 53 and 80 OF throughout the 
mission. The vacuum vent line temperature was maintained between 57 and 80 OF, 
while the nozzle temperature was maintained between 118 and 178 of. 
The waste collection system (WeS) performed adequately throughout the mission. 
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performance was nominal throughout 
the mission with no problems or anomalies identified. DTO 664 - Cabin 
Temperature Survey was performed with no problems. 
The ARS pressure control system performed nominally throughout the duration of 
the mission. During the redundant component check. the pressure control 
configuration was switched to the alternate system. Both systems exhibited normal 
operation. 
Airlock Support System 
Use of the airlock support system and components was not required because no 
extravehicular activity (EVA) was planned or required. The active system monitor 
parameters indicated normal outputs throughout the duration of the flight. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke generation during the 
entire duration of the flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required. 
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Avionics and Software Systems 
During entry, the performance of the integrated guidance and navigation system was 
nominal. Entry navigation sensors all functioned nominally, and there were no 
failures or deselections by RM. There was no navigation measurement data editing. 
Drag measurement processing started at 222K ft and ended at 64.9K ft. TACAN 
station acquisition occurred at approximately 142K ft with the cone-of-confusion 
spanning the 64.9K ft to 8K ft range of altitude. Air data transducer assembly 
(AOTA) data incorporation started at approximately nK ft and continued to 
approximately 15K ft. The microwave scanning beam landing system (MSBLS) 
processing in the navigation filter was initiated at approximately 15K ft, and all 
measurement residuals were nominal. The primary avionics software system-
backup flight system (PASS-BFS) state vector comparison in UVW coordinates 
showed that both systems were performing and tracking as expected. 
While flying a descending approach into Edwards, OTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic 
Control Surfaces Test - Alternate Elevon Schedule - was successfully performed with 
all programmed test inputs (PTls) satisfactorily completed. At the transition to 
approach/landing, OTO 254 - Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification - was 
satisfactorily completed. Drag chute deployment was completed prior to derotation 
in accordance with OTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System. 
A "BCE STRG 3 MTU" message was annunciated at 279:13:05 G.m.t. 
(06:01 :49 MET). This message indicates a problem in the serial 110 data path 
between the MTU and the GPC, including MOM FF 3 (Flight Problem STS-68-V-04). 
The MTU built-in test equipment (BITE) word was nominal, thus indicating no MTU 
problems. An 1/0 reset and string 3 port mode were performed in an unsuccessful 
attempt to clear the problem. Two good accumulators still existed, and this failure 
did not impact the flight other than the loss of MTU redundancy. An MOM BITE 
Status Read (BSR) was performed at 284:06:50:36 G.m.t. (10:19:34:36 MET) and it 
showed a nominal value of 0000. An MOM BITE Test was then performed about two 
minutes later and it also showed a nominal value of AAAA 5555). This was followed 
by a second MOM BSR approximately five minutes later that again showed nominal 
values. 
The flight control system performance was satisfactory except for one item. At 
283:12:10 G.m.t. (10:00:54 MET), the rudder channel 3 secondary differential 
pressure required approximately 1.96 seconds to increase to the failure-detection 
level (bypass) during the positive-stimulus portion of the secondary-actuator check 
in the FCS checkout procedure (Flight Problem STS-68-V-11). This problem is 
discussed in the Hydraulics section of this report. 
The performance of the three high accuracy inertial navigation system (HAINS) 
IMUs was very satisfactory throughout the prelaunch activities and the flight. The 
preflight alignment gyrocompass performance was exceptional with the largest mean 
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relative errors being -34 arcseconds. The largest misalignment mean correction 
observed during the scrub and the launch preflight alignments was 11 arcseconds. 
Only one uplink adjustment of gyro drift and two small adjustments of the 
accelerometers were performed during the flight. 
The star trackers operated nominally with no problems identified. 
Displays and Controls Subsystem 
At approximately 283:16:30 G.m.t. (10:05:54 MET), the crew reported that the tens 
digit on the Ku-band range rate/azimuth display on panel A2 was malfunctioning 
(Flight Problem STS-68-V-09). Only the upper left light-emitting diode (LED) was 
illuminated. When the lamp test was performed, all LEOs illuminated correctly. The 
crew used SPEC 201 for Ku-band stowing, which was completed nominally. 
At 283:23:46 G.m.t. (10:12:30 MET), the crew turned on the forward port floodlight 
and numerous current spikes ranging from 9 to 12 amperes dc were noted on the 
mid power control assembly (PCA) main A bus. These spikes are evidence of a 
known arCing phenomenon. The light was powered off, and other lights were 
available; consequently, the loss of this light did not impact mission operations. 
During configuration of the RCS to straight feed at 282:13:20:44 G.m.t. 
(09:02:04:44 MET), the crew reported that the left RCS 3/4/5 crossfeed valve 
talkback (indicator) showed barberpole when it should have indicated closed. The 
crew tapped the panel and reported that the talkback indication transitioned to 
closed. The data indicate a clean, simultaneous closure of both the fuel and oxidizer 
valves. This condition was documented during preflight activities and accepted as a 
fly-as-is condition. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystems 
The communications and tracking subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout the 
mission. The S-band communication link handover from the Wallops Island ground 
station to the Tracking and Data Relay (TORS) satellite during ascent was nominal. 
During the prelaunch time-frame at 273:07:00 G.m.t., TACAN 2 locked on in range 
but did not lock on in bearing while on the upper antenna and configured to KSC. 
When switched to the Patrick AFB TACAN beacon, TACAN 2 did not lock-on in 
bearing on the upper antenna. TACANs 1 and 3 performed nominally in both range 
and bearing, and while on the lower antennas all three TACANs operated nominally. 
Data review and analysis indicates that the cause of the TACAN 2 condition was 
poor signal because of multipath at the TACAN 2 upper antenna, combined with 
TACAN 2 having more sensitivity to such conditions. 
26 
At 273:19:54 G.m.t. (00:08:38 MET), Ku-band channel 2 data from an operations 
recorder dump were degraded (Flight Problem STS-68-1-01). Ku-band channel 3 
was active at the time with high-rate data from SIR-C and X-SAR. At 
273:20:18 G.m.t. (00:09:02 MET), channel 2 data were dumped again with nominal 
results. Channel 3 was not active at that time. This appears to be a repeat of the 
anomaly observed on this vehicle with the same payload during the STS-59 mission, 
and that anomaly was closed as an unexplained anomaly. The impact was minimal 
since channel 2 operations recorder dumps were avoided when payload data were 
being downlinked on channel 3. A troubleshooting plan was developed prior to flight 
to aid in determining the cause of the apparent interference. The Ku-band 
degradation troubleshooting procedure was performed at 279:18:20 G.m.t. 
(06:07:04 MET). The data collected during the test showed that the signature 
experienced during STS-59 was not duplicated. However, data from White Sands 
Ground Terminal (WSGT) and delog of Ku channel status from NASA Ground 
Terminal (NGT) were obtained and analyzed to isolate possible causes. The data 
analysis showed that 12 of 15 data-dropout incidents were directly related to 
operations recorder track changes, data gaps, or confirmed Applied Physics 
Laboratory recorder problems. Three incidents revealed severe degradation In 
channel 2 (operations recorder) data quality with no usable data, and these could 
not be correlated with track changes or data gaps. Data analysis showed that 
channel 3 contained the playback of SIR-C data during these three specific time 
periods when severe channel 2 degradation was observed. Channel 3 data were 
not affected. Also, all three instances were on the TORS-West using the 2-south 
ground eqUipment chain for data processing. 
During the Orbiter postflight crew debriefing, the crew reported continuous erratic 
readouts on the display panel and cathode ray tubes (CRTs) in SPEC 201 while 
performing the Ku-band stow procedures. The erratic readouts were noted while in 
the slow slew mode (0.4°/sec). The crew had been trained to expect erratic readouts 
in the fast-slew mode (20o/sec), and therefore, thought that the slew was "defaulting" 
to the fast mode. The crew noted this erratic behavior three times. Ku-band 
antenna stowage was performed during a dark pass without payload bay lights, so 
no visual report of the condition is available. Data show that the crew was hitting the 
alpha software stop, resulting in a 360 degree whip-around at 20 degrees/second to 
reach the requested position. Data show that this condition occurred five times. 
This scenario is a nominal occurrence. 
ODerationallnstrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System 
At approximately 282:08:50 G.m.t. (08:21:34 MET), degraded data were noted 
during playback of the Applied Physics Laboratory data on the payload recorder 
(Flight Problem STS-68-V-08). Track 2 had degraded data from the 68 to the 
100 percent position, track 3 was degraded from the 29 to the 68 percent position, 
and track 4 was degraded from the 84 to the 100 percent position. The APL data 
were on Ku-band channel 2 and SRL high-rate data were on Ku-band channel 3 
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during part. of these dumps. On-orbit troubleshooting was performed using different 
tape directions (forward and reverse) and dump ratios (1 to 1 and 16 to 1). This 
troubleshooting revealed that only tracks 1 and 5-14 were usable for the remainder 
of the mission. 
During postlanding operations, operations recorder 2, track 8 would not dump in 
either the forward or reverse directions (Flight Problem STS-68-V-12). The failure 
indication was an unmodulated carrier. All other tracks dumped (4 through 7 and 9 
and 10). Troubleshooting at KSC verified a bad track 8. The operations recorder 
will be removed, repaired and reinstalled. 
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems 
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed satisfactorily throughout the 
mission. The landing and braking data are shown in the table on the following 
page. 
The drag chute performance was excellent, and the deployment was completed at 
the planned time in the Orbiter rollout. As a result, only light braking was needed to 
bring the vehicle to a stop. Test condition 4 of oTO 521-Orbiter Drag Chute System 
was completed with this landing. 
Integrated Aerodynamics. Heating and Thermal Interfaces 
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems, anomalies, or 
unexpected conditions identified in the data. 
During entry, all five PTls required by DTO 251 Part 7 - Entry Aerodynamic Control 
Surfaces Test - Alternate Elevon Schedule were completed. Also, oTO 254 Part 4 -
Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification was performed during the final approach. All 
aileron and rudder inputs were as expected for this oTO. Likewise, DTO 521 - Orbiter 
Drag Chute System performance was as expected. 
The integrated heating during ascent and entry was nominal, based on the telemetry 
data and the plume appearance. The entry aerodynamic heating was nominal; 
however, postflight analysis and heating calculations are continuing as this is written. 
The performance of the thermal interfaces was nominal with all temperatures remaining 
within limits, and there were no LCC violations. 
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Landina and Braking Parameters 
From 
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ftlsec Pitch rate, 
ft keas dea/sec 
Main gear touchdown 3585 193.1 - -1.0 N/A 
Nose gear touchdown 7301 128.4 NlA -4.4 
Brake initiation speed 81.5 knots (keas) 
Brake-on time 34.0 seconds 
Rollout distance 8.490 feet 
Rollout time 61.8 seconds 
Runway 22 (Concrete) EAFB 
Orbiter weight at landing 221.571 Ib 
Peak 
Brake sensor pressure, Brake assembly Energy, 
location psi a million ft-Ib 
Left-hand inboard 1 648 Left-hand outboard 10.05 
Left-hand inboard 3 528 Left-hand inboard 12.54 
Left-hand outboard 2 540 Rieht-hand inboard 11.45 
Left-hand outboard 4 552 Rieht-hand outboard 8.60 
Right-hand inboard 1 588 
Right-hand inboard 3 480 
Right-hand outboard 2 420 
Right-hand outboard 4 444 
Thermal Control Subsystem 
The thermal control subsystem performance was nominal. 
The FES primary accumulator line A thermostat cycled erratically at the upper end of 
its set-point range on the system 2 heater. The erratic cycling caused the high-load 
feedwater line to exceed the upper limit of 250 OF for an extended period of time 
(Flight Problem STS-68-V-05). This anomaly is discussed in greater detail in the 
Environmental Control and Life Support System section of this report. 
Aerothermodynamics 
The acreage heating during entry was within limits, and the local heating was 
nominal. The structural temperature rise was symmetrical on the right and left wings 
and within the experience base. 
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Thermal Protection Subsystem 
The TPS perfonned satisfactorily. Based on structural temperature response data 
(temperature rise), the entry heating was above average. Boundary layer transition 
from laminar flow to turbulent flow occurred at 1379 seconds after entry interface on 
the forward centerline of the vehicle, and at 1335 seconds on the aft centerline of the 
vehicle. This is the latest that transition has occurred on all the flights with available 
data. Based on the two available right-te-Ieft side thennocouple pairs on this 
vehicle, transition occurred 35 and 55 seconds, respectively, earlier on the left side 
of the vehicle, but still occurred much later than average. 
Based on a postlanding inspection of the Orbiter, overall debris damage was below 
average. Data show 110 impacts with 15 having a major dimension of 1 inch or 
greater. The Orbiter lower surface sustained 59 hits (91 average) of which 9 
had a major dimension of 1 inch or greater (14 average). Two damage sites, one 
near the L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical and the other near the nose landing gear door, 
had embedded debris. The debris was removed prior to ferry flight for analysis at 
KSC to detennine the source. 
At approximately 27S:04:50 G.m.t. (04:17:34 MET), the crew reported that a tile was 
missing along the inboard aft edge of the port-side overhead window (WS) (Flight 
Problem STS-6S-V-01). The fractured tile was identified as V07Q-39006S-059. The 
majority of the tile appeared to be missing, with the fracture plane occurring at the 
densified layer. The remaining densified layer of tile material was seen in the video 
as a rough edge above the white folded ceramic sleeving. Video previously 
downlinked at 275:09:40 G.m.t. (01 :22:24 MET) also showed that the tile was 
missing, and this downlink was almost 72 hours earlier than first reported. An 
analysis showed that the loss of this tile would not impact on-orbit or entry 
operations. The postflight analysis of this failure revealed that the tile had failed in-
plane, and the strain isolation pad (SIP) and densified tile layer still remaining. This 
was the condition expected based on in-flight reports. No thennal degradation of the 
area was noted. 
The largest damage site was on the right-hand OMS pod forward-facing surface and 
measured 5 inches by 5 inches by 2 inches. The right-hand OMS pod forward face 
tile was most probably damaged during ascent. Streamers were visible from the 
nght OMS pod at approximately 36 seconds (Mach = 0.7) and they are considered 
evidence of debris impact. The crew downlinked video of the right OMS pod that 
showed two damaged tiles near the center leading edge of the pod. The analysis of 
the tile damage detennined that the condition was not a safety-of-flight issue, and 
the damage did not impact the mission. The postflight inspection revealed a dime-
sized bum-through of the forward-most tile's SIP, discolored graphite/epoxy, and 
charred filler bar. The inspections also revealed three damage sites on the upper 
PLBD flexible reusable surface insulation (FRSI) felt insulation. The location of the 
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damaged areas indicates that the tile portion lost from around window 8 impacted 
the leading edge of the OMS pod. 
The number of damage sites on the base heat shield was less than the number 
normally seen, and the majority of the hits were located near the center of the base 
heat shield. The dome-mounted heat shield closeout blankets on all three SSMEs 
were in excellent condition. The six toughened unipiece fibrous insulation (TUFI) 
tiles located on the carrier panel between engines 2 and 3 were not damaged. 
The nose cap and chin panel areas were in good condition. The nose landing gear 
door (NLGD) thermal barriers (TB's) were in good condition with only minor fraying. 
Three tiles on the NLGD periphery had edge damages greater than 1 inch. 
The crew reported streaking/smearing on windows W2, W3, W4, and W5. Windows 
2, 3, 4, and 5 exhibited light hazing and streaks, with windows 3 and 4 shOWing more 
streaking than the other windows. The postflight assessment of the Orbiter window 
conditions concluded that the streaks/smearing was caused by the impact of the 
forward ReS thruster covers (butcher paper) during ascent. 
Numerous small impact sites were noted on the perimeter tiles on windows 2, 3, 4, 
and 5. Seven tile damage sites, with two larger than one inch, were observed above 
and between windows 3 and 4. 
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REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM 
The remote manipulator system (RMS) was not activated nor used during this 
mission. 
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
The flight crew equipment/Govemment fumished equipment (FCElGFE) performed 
acceptably. The crew stated in the debriefing that there were no gas bubbles in the 
clear drink containers that were used to evaluate the galley water for gas. This 
Shuttle Orbiter Repackaged Galley (SORG) was the same one (SIN 1002) flown on 
STS-59 during which several problems were experienced with gas in the water. 
Ten in-flight anomalies were written against the FCElGFE hardware during STS-68. 
These are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
At 273:18:06 G.m.t. (00:06:50 MET), during downlink of video from closed circuit 
television (CCTV) camera B, a smudge was noted in the lower right quadrant of the 
video image (Flight Problem STS-68-F-01). The video from this camera was usable 
and this problem did not impact television operations. 
At 2n:15:50 G.m.t. (04:04:34 MET), CCTV camera C exhibited horizontal lines in 
the video (Flight Problem STS-68-F-05). The image was a dark view of the Earth. 
When the payload bay came Into light, the lines disappeared. 
Video from CCTV camera 0 had a foggy area (Flight Problem STS-68-F-06). The 
area was a disc located in the center of the video image, and it gave the appearance 
of looking through fog. 
Four Linhof camera and magazine anomalies occurred during the mission. 
a. The crew reported at 275:00:30 G.m.t. (01:13:14 MET) that the Linhof 
camera had failed (Flight Problem STS-68-F-02). They performed the applicable 
malfunction procedure which included replacing the lenslbody fuse. The camera 
function was not restored. The crew then changed the magazine and camera 
function was restored The film was removed from the inoperative magazine 
(SIN 1006) and stored. The inoperative magazine was marked and also stored. 
b. The crew reported that the counter on a Linhof camera magazine 
(SIN 1005) had stopped working (Flight Problem STS-68-F-03); however, the 
camera and magazine appeared to be operating nominally when photographs were 
being taken. 
c. The crew stated at 278:23:36 G.m.t. (05:12:20 MET) that the Linhof 
camera magazine SIN 1009 had a blown fuse (Flight Problem STS-68-F-07). The 
fuse was replaced and the magazine operated properly. The magazine 
subsequently blew another fuse. It was replaced and normal operation was 
recovered. 
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d. The crew reported at 283:16:59 G.m.t. (10:05:43 MET) that the Linhof 
power cable was providing power intermittently to the camera (Flight Problem 
STS-68-F-09). Postflight testing of the cable is required to resolve this problem. 
At 277:15:24 G.m.t. (04:04:08 MET), the crew reported that the Hasselblad camera 
(SIN 1035) failed to operate (Flight Problem STS-68-F-04). The crew performed the 
appropriate malfunction procedure from the PhotofTV checklist and camera 
operation was restored by replacing a failed fuse in the camera body. The camera 
operated satisfactorily for the rest of the mission. 
The crew reported that four of the six stereo headsets exhibited a shorted condition 
while in use with the portable compact disc player (Flight Problem STS-68-F-08). 
The crew reported at 283:16:59 G.m.t. (10:05:43 MET) that two problems were noted 
with the two Nikon F4 cameras. Camera SIN 1004 had a diopter than was no longer 
adjustable (Flight Problem STS-68-F-10A). Camera SIN 1008 had a diopter that 
operated, but resistance was encountered at some point during the rotation (Flight 
Problem STS-68-F-108). 
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CARGO INTEGRATION 
The cargo integration hardware performance was nominal throughout the mission. 
No anomalous operation was noted or reported. 
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTlVESIDETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY 
OBJECTIVES 
A total of 16 Development Test Objectives (DTOs) and 15 Detailed Supplementary 
Objectives (DSOs) were defined for the STS-66 mission. Preliminary results are 
presented, where available, in the following paragraphs. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES 
DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - Alternate Elevon Schedule-
A" five programmed test inputs were performed during entry. Data have been given 
to the sponsor, and the results of the data analysis will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
DTO 254 - Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification - The planned maneuvers during 
final descent were performed. The data from these maneuvers have been given to 
the sponsor. The results of the analysiS will be published in separate 
documentation. 
DTO 301 D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - This DTO was performed 
during the ascent phase of the mission. Postflight data evaluation is required as the 
data were recorded on board the vehicle and the recorder cannot be dumped during 
flight. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will 
be published in separate documentation. 
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - This DTO was performed 
during the ascent phase of the mission. Postflight data evaluation is required as the 
data were recorded onboard the vehicle and the recorder cannot be dumped during 
flight. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will 
be published in separate documentation. 
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - This DTO was performed 
during the entry phase of the mission. Postflight data evaluation is required as the 
data were recorded onboard the vehicle and the recorder cannot be dumped during 
flight. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will 
be published in separate documentation. 
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - This DTO was performed during the entry 
phase of the mission. Postflight data evaluation is required as the data were 
recorded onboard the vehicle and the recorder cannot be dumped during flight. The 
data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published 
in separate documentation. 
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DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance - Photography of the ET after separation was 
acquired with the Nikon camera that has a 300 mm lens and a 2X extender. 
Thirty-eight photographs of the ET were obtained, and the exposure and focus on all 
photographs were good. The first picture was taken approximately 13.7 minutes 
after liftoff and the last photograph was taken approximately 5 minutes later. 
All aspects of the ET were imaged. The ET was in good condition. No unusual 
markings were observed. Four white marks (probable divots) are visible on the ET 
TPS: 
a. A distinctive white mark is visible on the side of the ET away from the 
Orbiter (+Y/-Z axis) at the LH2 tanklintertank interface; 
b. A white mark is visible on the LH2 tank TPS aft of the ground umbilical 
carrier plate (GUCP) (-Yaxis); 
c. A white mark is visible on the LH2 tank TPS just aft of the LH2 tanklintertank 
interface and in the -Y direction from the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod; and 
d. A white mark is visible on the aft third of the hydrogen tank on the -Y axis. 
DTO 414 - APU Shutdown Test - The APUs were shut down in the order planned 
following ascent. No evidence of back-driving was noted in the data. The data from 
the DTO are being reviewed by the sponsor, and the results of that review and 
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. 
DTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System - All activities required in test condition 4 
were completed. As a result, this phase of the DTO was completed. The data are 
being evaluated and the results will be reported in separate documentation. 
DTO 656 - Payload and General Support Computer (PGSC) Single Event Upset 
Monitoring - All activities planned for this DTO were completed. The data from the 
DTO are being reviewed by the sponsor and the results of that evaluation will be 
reported in separate documentation. 
DTO 664 - Cabin Temperature Survey - All temperature measurements were made 
by the crew and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results 
of that evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. 
DTO 674 - Thermo-Electric Liquid Cooling System Evaluation - The activities 
scheduled dunng ascent and descent were performed. The data have been given to 
the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be reported in 
separate documentation. 
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OTO 700-8 - Global Positioning System Development Flight Test - The OTO 
hardware performed nominally throughout the mission. System re-initialization 
commands were required to reset the hardware because of a known software 
problem which is being corrected for all future flights. The data from this OTO have 
been given to the sponsor and the results of that evaluation will be reported in 
separate documentation. 
OTO-805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - Conditions to satisfy this OTO were 
not present; consequently, this OTO was not performed. 
OTO 1119 - Orbiter Evaluation of Reduced MILA S-Band Uplink Power During 
Ascent (500 W) - All activities in support of this OTO were completed and the data 
were collected and given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation 
will be reported in separate documentation. 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
OSO 317 - Collection of Shuttle Humidity Condensate for Analytical Evaluation-
Three samples of condensate were collected as planned. These samples have been 
given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in 
separate documentation. 
OSO 326 - Window Impact Observations - The windows were inspected daily and a 
status report was given to the Mission Control. These reports were given to the 
sponsor along with data from a detailed postflight inspection. The data will be 
evaluated and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
OSO 484 - Assessment of Circadian Shifting in Astronauts by Bright Light - All 
planned activities were scheduled and completed. The results of the activities were 
given to the sponsor, and the evaluation of the results will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
OSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - All planned activities were 
scheduled and completed. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, 
and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. 
OSO 491 - Characterization of Microbial Transfer Among Crewmembers During 
Space Flight - All planned activities were scheduled and completed. The data have 
been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be 
reported in separate documentation. 
OSO 603B - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing and Egress - All planned 
activities were completed during entry, landing and egress. The data were given to 
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the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in 
separate documentation. 
DSO 604 - Visual-Vestibular Integration as a Function of Adaptation - All planned 
activities were scheduled and completed. The data have been given to the sponsor 
for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
DSO 605 - Postural Equilibrium Control During Landing/Egress - All planned 
activities were completed during landing and egress. The data were given to the 
sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
DSO 614B - The Effect of Prolonged Space Flight on Head and Gaze Stability 
During Locomotion - All planned activities were scheduled and completed. The data 
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will 
be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 621 - In-Flight Use of Florinef to Improve Orthostatic Intolerance Postflight- All 
planned activities were scheduled and completed. The data have been given to the 
sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
DSO 624 - Preflight and Postflight Measurement of Cardiorespiratory Responses to 
Submaximal Exercise - Exercise-activity measurements as well as preflight and 
postflight testing were scheduled throughout the flight and these were completed. 
Data were collected for the sponsor's evaluation, and the results of that evaluation 
will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 626 - Cardiovascular and Cerebrovascular Responses to Standing Before and 
After Space Flight - All planned preflight and postflight activities were completed. 
The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the 
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Video was taken throughout the mission and 
the downlinks as well as the on board tapes have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation. The results of that analysis will be presented in separate documentation. 
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Motion pictures were taken 
throughout the mission. The films have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, 
and the results of that analysis will be reported in separate documentation 
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - Still photographs were taken throughout 
the mission. The film has been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results 
of that evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. 
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS 
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS 
The STS-68 mission was launched from Complex 39 A on October 11, 1994. On 
launch day, 22 videos of the launch activities were reviewed, and no anomalies were 
found. On the days following the launch, 53 of 54 planned films were reviewed. 
One camera did not run properly and the film was not of use for evaluation. Several 
films were rescreened in an effort to find events that related to the damage to the 
right OMS pod and the smears on the forward windows. No definitive evidence of 
the debris causing the damage was found. 
In addition, 38 images of the ET after separation were obtained by the crew in 
support of DTO 312. The results of the analysis of those frames are presented in 
the Development Test Objectives section of this report. 
Three rolls of STS-68 umbilical well camera film were evaluated at JSC, and these 
consisted of one roll of 35mm from the L02 umbilical camera and two rolls of 16mm 
from the LH2 umbilical well. The 35mm film had good exposure and focus on the 
sun-lit portions of the ET (L02 umbilical and +Y side of ET were in shadow). The 
16mm films also have good exposure and good focus. The ET separation sequence 
from the 16mm films had variable exposure and good focus. Timing data were not 
present on the 35mm film, but it was present on the 16mm films. The analysis 
revealed no anomalies in any of the films. 
ON-oRBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
The crew downlinked video of the right OMS pod that showed two damaged tiles 
near the center leading edge of the pod. The analysis of the tile damage determined 
that the condition was not a safety-of-flight issue, and the damage did not impact the 
mission. 
A tile was missing along the inboard aft edge of the port-side overhead window (W8) 
(Flight Problem STS-68-V-01). The fractured tile was identified as 
V07Q-390068-059. The majority of the tile appeared to be miSSing with the fracture 
plane occurring at the densified layer. The remaining densified layer of tile material 
was seen in the video as a rough edge above the white folded ceramic sleeving. 
The video review showed that the tile was missing in video downlinked at 
275:09:40 G.m.t. (01 :22:24 MET), which was almost 72 hours earlier than first 
reported. An analysis showed that the loss of this tile would not impact on-orbit or 
entry operations. 
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LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS 
Landing occurred on concrete runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base on October 11 , 
1994. Six videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing phase were reviewed, and 
no anomalies were detected. In addition 15 landing films were reviewed, and these, 
likewise, did not show any anomalies. 
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TABLE 1.- STS-68 MISSION EVENTS 
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t. 
Launch Abort 
APU ActIVation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 230:10:49:10.65 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 230:10:49:11.83 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 230:10:49:12.60 
SRB HPU ActlVatlona LH HPU System A start command 230:10:53:32.170 
LH HPU System B start command 230:10:53:32.290 
RH HPU System A start command 230:10:53.32.450 
RH HPU SYstem B start command 230:10:53:32.610 
Mam Propulsion System ME-3 Start command accepted 230:10:53:53.437 
Starta ME-2 Start command accepted 230:10:53:53.558 
ME-1 Start command accepted 230:10:53:53.679 
Main PropulSion System ME-3 Shutdown 230:10:53:58.157 
Stopa ME-2 Shutdown 230:10:53:59.358 
ME-1 Shutdown 230:10:54:00.638 
APU DeactIVation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 230:10:55:04.06 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 230:10:55:04.81 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 230:10:55:06.04 
Launch 
APU ActIVation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 273:11:11:11.33 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 273:11 :11 :12.18 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 273:11 :11 :12.99 
SRB HPU Activatlona LH HPU System A start command 273:11 :15:32.621 
LH HPU System B start command 273:11 :15:32.781 
RH HPU System A start command 273:11 :15.32.621 
RH HPU SYstem B start command 273:11:15:32.781 
Mam Propulsion System ME-3 Start command accepted 273:11 :15:53.459 
Starta ME-2 Start command accepted 273:11 :15:53.549 
ME-1 Start command acceJ)1ed 273:11 :15:53.682 
SRB Ignition Command Calculated SRB Ignition command 273:11 :16:00.011 
(Liftoff) 
Throttle up to 104 Percent ME-1 Command accepted 273:11 :16:03.803 
Thrusta ME-3 Command accepted 273:11 :16:03.819 
ME-2 Command accepted 273:11 :16:03.825 
Throttle down to ME-1 Command accepted 273:11 :16:27.323 
67 Percent Thrusta ME-3 Command accepted 273:11 :16:27.340 
ME-2 Command accepted 273:11 :16:27.346 
Maximum Dynamic Pressure Denved ascent dynamic pressure 273:11:16:51 
(a) 
Throttle up to 104 Percent" ME-1 Command accepted 273:11 :17:00.444 
ME-3 Command accepted 273:11 :17:00.461 
ME-2 Command acceoted 273:11 :17:00.466 
Both SRM's Chamber RH SRM chamber pressure 273:11 :17:58.531 
Pressure at 50 pSla mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 273:11 :17:58.571 
mid-ranee select 
aMSFC supplied data 
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TABLE 1.- STS-68 MISSION EVENTS 
(Continued) 
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t. 
End SRM _ Action- RH SRM chamber pressure 273:11 :18:00.751 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 273:11 :18:00.801 
mid-ranee select 
SRB Physical Separation- LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS 273:11 :18:03.491 
RH rate APU turbine soeed - LOS 273:11 :18:03.491 
SRB SeJ)aration Command SRB seoaratlOn command flae 273:11 :18:04 
Throttle Down for ME-1 command accepted 273:11 :23:30.374 
3g Acceleration- ME-3 command accepted 273:11 :23:30.389 
ME-2 command accepted 273:11 :23:30.394 
3a Acceleration Total load factor 273:11 :23:30.2 
Throttle Down to ME-1 command accepted 273:11 :24:27.015 
67 Percent Thrusta ME-3 command accepted 273:11 :24:27.031 
ME-2 command accepted 273:11 :24:27.035 
SSME Shutdown" ME-1 command accepted 273:11:24:33.415 
ME-3 command accepted 273:11 :24:33.431 
ME-2 command acceoted 273:11 :24:33.435 
MECO MECO command flag 273:11 :24:34 
MECO confirm flag 273:11 :24:35 
ET Separation ET separatIOn command flac 273:11 :24:54 
APU Deactivation APU-2 GG chamber pressure 273:11 :29:55.80 
APU 1 GG chamber pressure 273:11 :30:10.57 
APU 3 GG chamber pressure 273:11 :30:25.07 
OMS-1 Ignition Left engine bi-prop valve position Not performed -
Right engine bl-prop valve position direct insertion 
traiectorv flown 
OMS-1 Cutoff Left engine bl-prop valve poSition 
Right enelne bl-prop valveJH)sltlon 
OMS-2 Ignition Left engine bl-prop valve position 273:11 :51 :09.9 
Richt engine bi-prop valve position 273:11:51:10.0 
OMS-2 Cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve position 273:11 :52:48.2 
Rlcht enClne bl-prop valve position 273:11 :52:48.2 
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs) PLBD right open 1 273:12:48:24 
Open PLBD left open 1 273:12:49:44 
Alght Control System 
Checkout 
APU Start APU-1 GG chamber pressure 283:12:08:21.81 
APU Stoo APU-1 GG chamber oressure 283:12:12:38.39 
Payload Bay Doors Close PLBD left close 1 284:12:03:41 
PLBD naht close 1 284:12:06:13 
APU Activation for Entry APU-2 GG chamber pressure 284:16:02:23.71 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 284:16:16:59.54 
APU-3 GG chamber oressure 284:16:17:01.90 
Deorblt Bum Ignition Left engine bl-prop valve position 284:16:07:19.3 
Rlcht engine bl-prop valve position 284:16:07:19.3 
Deorblt Bum Cutoff Left engine bl-prop valve pOSItion 284:16:09:38.0 
Rlcht engine bl-prop valveJtosltlon 284:16:09:38.0 
_ MSFC supplied data. 
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TABLE I.- STs-&8 MISSION EVENTS 
(Continued) 
Event Description Actual time, 
G.m.t. 
Entrv Interface (400K feet) Current orbital altitude above 284:16:29:46 
Blackout end Data locked (hlah sample rate) No blackout 
Terminal Area Enerav Malor mode chance (305) 284:16:56:02 
Main Landing Gear LH main landing gear tire pressure 1 284:17:02:08 
Contact RH main IandlnQ aear tire eressure 2 284:17:02:08 
Main Landing Gear LH main landing gear weight on wheels 284:17:02:08 
Welaht on Wheels RH main landlna aear welaht on wheels 284:17:02:09 
Draa Chute Deelovrnent Draa chute deplov 1 CP Volts 284:17:02:106 
Nose landing Gear NLG LH tire pressure 1 284:17:02:21 
Contact 
Nose landing Gear NLG weight on wheels 1 284:17:02:21 
Welaht On Wheels 
Draa Chute Jettison Draa chute jettison 1 CP Volts 284:17:02:45.3 
Wheel Stoe Velocitv with resoect to runway 284:17:03:10 
APU Deactivation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 284:17:16:52.06 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 284:17:16:55.97 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 284:17:16:57.64 
44 
TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
No. Title Time Comments 
STS-68-V-01 Missing Tile Along Aft Edge of 278:04:50 G.m.t. At approximately 278:04:50 G.m.t. (04:17:34 MET). the crew reported 
Port Overhead Window 04:17:34 MET that a tile was missing along the Inboard aft edge of the port side 
CAR 68RF08 overhead window (W8). Video showed the remaining densifled layer 
of tile material as a rough edge above the white folded ceramic 
sleeving. There were no on-orbit or entry thermal concerns. (Video 
downlinked at 275:09:40 G.m.t. shows the tile missing.) Visual 
inspection at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) verified that the I 
denslfied layer of the tile was intact. There is no evidence of over- I 
temperature of the structure. Remaining damaged tile material to be 
removed and shiooed to RockwelllDownev for evaluation. 
STS-68-V-02 RCS Vemler Thruster L5D 278:17:59 G.m.t. At 278:17:59 G.m.t. (05:06:43 MET). the left aft RCS thruster LSD 
Oxidizer Temperature Erratic. 05:06:43 MET oxidizer Injector temperature became erratic. A fuel leak message 
CAR 684RF01 was annunciated. and the thruster was deselected by the redundancy 
IPR 67V-0005 management (RM). A GMEM was applied which lowered the oxidizer 
~ leak detection temperature of the vemier thrusters to 0 OF. with the fuel leak detection temperature remaining at 130 OF. Data analysis 
showed that the data signature was typical of a sensor or wiring 
problem. most likely between the sensor and the dedicated signal 
conditioner (DSC). The thruster continued to function nominally. 
KSC: Troubleshoot to Isolate the cause of the anomaly. Spare is 
available. 
STS-68-V-03 Primary RCS Thruster L3D Failed 279:05:00 G.m.t. At 279:05:00 G.m.t. (05:17:44 MEn. primary RCS thruster L3D failed 
Off 05:17:44 MET off after operating successfully for numerous pulses. The RCS RM 
CAR 68RF02 annunciated a fail-off condition when three consecutive 80 msec 
firings had chamber pressures of less than 10 pSia. There was no 
indication of a leak, and the thruster remained selected for the 
remainder of the mission. 
KSC: Remove and replace thruster. The thruster will be sent to 
White Sands Test Facility for failure Investlaatlon. Spare Is available. I 
STS-68-V-04 Master Timing Unit (MTU) 279:13:05 G.m.t. A BCE STRG 3 MTU message was annunciated at 279:13:05 G.m.t. I 
Accumulator 3 Element Bypass 06:01 :49 MET (06:01 :49 MEn. An Input/output (1/0) reset and string 3 port mode 
IPR 67V-0008 were performed In an unsuccessful attempt to clear the problem. The I 
CAR 68RF09 MTU BITE word did not indicate any MTU problems. A BITE test and 
BSR read of MOM FF3 did not Indicate a problem. 
KSC: Troubleshooting isolated the problem to the MTU. MTU will 
be reolaced with available soare. 
-- -- --
TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
STS-68-V-05 FES Accumulator/Hi-Load 278:15:15 G.m.t. After the FES feed line heater reconflguratlon to heater system 2 at 
Feedllne A Heater 2 Erratic 05:03:59 MET 278:15:15 G.m.t. (05:03:59 MET), the FES feedllne A high-load line 
Operation CAR 68Rf10 temperature went off-scale high (> 250 oF) for nearly eight hours. The 
Level III Closure 
FES feedllne A accumulator line temperature measurement has been 
experiencing erratic cycling during the off-scale high periods and has 
maintained temperatures above the nominal thermostat control band. 
The crew switched back to heater system 1 at 280:04:14 G.m.t. 
(06:16:58 MET) and all temperature conditions became nominal. 
KSC: Troubleshoot to determine cause of erratic cycling. Vehicle 
ferried with heater svstem 1 activated. 
STS-68-V-06 Water Spray Boiler System 2 272:22:39 G.m.t. The water spray boiler (WSB) system 2 GN2 regulator had two Internal 
GN2 Regulator Leak Prelaunch out-of-speclflcatlon leakages when the Isolation valves were opened 
HYD-5-08-0186 during the prelaunch time-frame. The first regulator leakage was 
CAR 68RF03 about 42 sccm (redllne limit Is 10 secm) over a 26-mlnute period 
following the first Isolation valve opening. The second leakage was 
73 seem over a 28-mlnute period just prior to launch. On-orbit, the 
Isolation valves were closed In accordance with nominal procedures to 
decrease the sensitivity of the GN2 tanks to Internal regulator leakage. 
~ A 22-sccm leak rate was observed when the GN2 Isolation valve was opened for entry. 
KSC: Remove and reDlace the reaulator. 
STS-68-V-07 Water Spray Boller 1 GN2 273:14:35 G.m.t. The WSB 1 GN2 regulator pressure began to decay following WSB 
Regulator Pressure Decay 00:03:19 MET deactivation after ascent. The slow decay In pressure continued 
HYD-5-08-o185 throughout the mission and by entry day the pressure had decayed to 
CAR 68RF04 16.8 psia. The pressure decay is believed to be due to GN2 leakage 
through the regulator relief valve. 
KSC: Removed and reDlaced the reaulator. 
STS-68-V-08 Degraded Tracks on Payload 283:16:31 G.m.t. Dunng playbacks of the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) data on the 
Recorder 10.05.15 MET payload recorder, degraded data quality was experienced from the 
68-percent to the 100-percent tape position of track 2, from the 
Level III Closure 29-percent to 68-percent on track 3, and 84-percent ot 100-percent on 
track 4. The APL data were on Ku-band channel 2 and SRL high-rate 
data were on Ku-band channel 3 during parts of these dumps. 
In-flight troubleshooting was performed using different tape directions 
(forward and reverse) and dump ratios (1 to 1 and 16 to 1). Tracks 2, 
3, and 4 were not used the remainder of the mission. Tracks 1 and 
5-14 were still available. 
KSC: Troubleshoot payload recorder. 
TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
STS-68-V-09 Ku-band Range Rate/Azimuth 283:16:31 G.m.t. At approximately 283:16:31 G.m.t. (10:05:15 MET), the crew reported 
Display Tens Digit Failed 10:05:15 MET that on panel A2, the tens digit of the Ku-band range rate/azimuth 
CAR 68RF05 display was malfunctioning. Only the upper left LED was illuminated. 
Level III Closure When the lamp test was performed, all LEOs illuminated. The fault 
lamp Is on all the time (even during the lamp test). The cr ew used 
Spec 21 for Ku-band stowing. 
KSC: Troubleshooting repeated the problem (additional digits failed). 
Additional troubleshooting planned. Potential digital display 
remacement with available spare. 
STS-68-V-10 WSB System 3 Leak Postlanding Shortly after APU 3 shutdown after landing, WSB 3 regulator outlet 
IPR 67V-0006 pressure started a rapid decay In pressure. The pressure dropped 
HYD-5-00-0187 from approximately 38.1 psla to 19.8 psia In Just over one hour. This 
CAR 68RF06 WSB system was stable throughout the entire mission. A water leak 
was observed coming from the ET umbilical doors and centerline 
hinge while the Orbiter was stili on the runway. It has been verified 
that the water came from WSB 3. The WSB was inspected at Dryden 
Flight Research Center and the source of the leak was found to be a i 
crack on the lube 011 spray valve Inlet stem between the valve body 
~ STS-68-V-11 Slow Pressure Increase During 
and B-nut. 
283:12:10 G.m.t. At 283:12:10 G.m.t. (10:00:54 MEn, the rudder channel 3 
Rudder Channel 3 Secondary 10:00:54 MET secondary differential pressure required approximately 1.96 seconds 
Actuator Check IPR 67V-0010 to Increase to the failure detection level during the positive stimulus 
CAR 68RF07 portion of the secondary actuator check In the FCS checkout 
procedure. The channel bypassed nominally during the negatIVe 
stimulus portion of the test. A delay of 1.44 seconds was noted on I 
OV-105s previous flight (STS-59). Data review also shows that the 
delay occurred on STS-57 (less than 1 second), STS-54 (less than 
0.25 second) and STS-49 (less than 0.15 second. There were no I 
delays apparent on ST5-47 and STS-61. 
KSC: Troubleshooting and data review Indicate channel 3 sluggish. 
The rudder soeedbrake PDU will be replaced with available spare. 
Sr5-68-V-12 Operations (OPS) Recorder Postlandlng During postlandlng OPS recorder dump operations, OPS 2 track 8 
2 Track 8 Failed to Dump CAR 68RF11 would not dump In either the forward or reverse directions. The site 
! Indication was a carrier signal with no modulation. All other tracks 
Level III Closure dumped (4 through 7 and 9 and 10). 
KSC: Troubleshooting verified a bad track 8. OPS recorder will be I 
~--
rernoved and replaced. 
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TABLE 111.- GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
No. Title Time Comments 
STS-68-F-01 Smudge on Camera B Lens 274:01 :27 G.m.t. During downlink of camera B, a smudge was noted 
000:14:11 MET in the lower riaht Quadrant of the video imaae. 
STS-68-F-02 Linhof Camera Magazine 275:01 :00 G.m.t. The crew reported that a Linhof camera had failed. 
(sin 1006) Failure 001:13:44 MET The camera fuse was replaced, but normal camera 
operation was not restored. Subsequently, the 
magazine was replaced, and normal camera 
operation was regained. The inoperative magazine 
(SIN 1006) was marked and stowed. 
STS-68-F-03 Linhof Camera Magazine 276:21:13 G.m.t. The crew stated that the counter on a Linhoff 
(sin 1005) Counter Inoperative 003:09:57 MET camera magazine (SIN 1005) had stopped working; 
& however, the camera and magazine appeared to be operating nominally because ht supply reel of the 
magazine spins with the snapshots. 
STS-68-F-04 Hasselblad Camera Failure 277:15:24 G.m.t. At 2n:15:24 G.m.t. (04:04:08 MEn, the crew 
004:04:08 MET reported that the Hasselblad camera (SIN 1035) 
failed to operate. The crew performed malfunction 
procedure 3.1 a from the Photo/TV checklist and 
camera operation was recovered by replacing a 
failed fuse in the camera body. The camera 
continued to operate nominally. 
STS-68-F-05 CCTV Camera C Horizontal 277:15:50 G.m.t. At 277:15:50 G.m.t. (04:04:34 MET), CCTV camera 
Lines in Video 004:04:34 MET Chad horizontal lines in the video. The image was 
a dark view of the Earth and payload baya. When 
the payload bay came into light, the lines 
disappeared. 
~-~ _._---
- -- --
~ 
co 
STS-68-F-06 
STS-68-F-07 
STS-68-F-08 
STS-68-F-09 
STS-68-F-10 
TABLE 111.- GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
CTVC D Foggy Area in Image 278:01 :29 G.m.t. A ''foggy II area was noted in the CTVC D video. 
004:14:13 MET The area is a disk located in the center of the video 
image and gives the appearance of looking through 
fog. 
Linhof Camera Magazine 277:03:03 G.m.t. The crew stated that the Linhof camera magazine 
(SIN 1009) Blown Fuses 003: 15:47 MET (SIN 1009) blew a fuse at 277:03:03 G.m.t. 
(03:15:47 MET), and that the bad fuse light was 
illuminated. The fuse was replaced and the 
magazine functioned nominally. At 278:19:35 G.m.t. 
(05:08:19 MET), the crew reported another blown 
fuse in the magazine. The fuse was replace and the 
m~azine functioned normally. 
Stereo Headset Intermittent 283:16:59 G.m.t. The crew reported that multiple headsets (the 
Problem 010:05:43 MET number was not specified) suffered from an 
intermittent short while in use with the Discman. 
Linhof Camera Power Cable 283:16:59 G.m.t. The crew reported that a Linhof camera power cable 
Problem 010:05:43 MET was providina Dower intermittently to the camera. 
Nikon F4 Diopter Failures 283:16:59 G.m.t. The crew reported the following problems with two 
010:05:43 MET Nikon cameras. SIN 1004 has a diopter that is no I 
longer adjustable. SIN 1008 has a diopter that I 
encounters resistance at some point durina rotation. 
(J1 
o 
No. 
STS-68-E-01 
STS-68-E-02 
TABLE IV.- MSFC PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Title Time Comments 
Main Engine 3 Exceeded launch Main engine 3 exceeding the high pressure oxidizer turbine 
High Pressure Oxidizer Abort discharge temperature was the cause of the pad abort. 
Turbine Discharge 
Temperature LCC 
Cracked Sheet in launch The pad-abort inspection revealed a crack in the turbine 
Turnaround Duct in Abort discharge sheet metal turnaround duct. This crack was 
Turbine Discharge of High Inspection 4.6 inches long with cracks running 90 degrees to the long 
Pressure Fuel Turbopump crack making a flap. The flap was resting on the coolant 
JU/N 4113R2) liner.-
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items 
are used In this document. 
ADTA 
APL 
APU 
ARS 
ATCS 
BFS 
BITE 
BRIC 
BSR 
CCTV 
CEI 
CHROMEX 
CPCG 
CREAM 
CRIM 
CRT 
DEEM 
DSO 
DTO 
aV 
ECLSS 
EGT 
EPDC 
ESC 
ET 
EVA 
FCE 
FCL 
FCP 
FCS 
FDA 
FES 
FF 
FlO 
FRSI 
ftlsec 
GAS 
GFE 
GMEM 
G.m.t. 
GN2 
G02 
GPC 
air data transducer assembly 
Applied PhysIcs Laboratory 
auxiliary power unit 
atmospheric revitalization system 
active thermal control system 
backup flight system 
built-in test equipment 
Biological Research In Canisters 
BITE status read 
closed circuit teleVision 
Contract End item 
Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space 
Commercial Protein Crystal Growth 
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor 
Commercial Refrigerator/Incubator Module 
cathode ray tube 
digital elevation map 
Detailed Supplementary ObjectIVe 
Developmental Test Objective 
differential velOCity 
EnVironmental control and life support system 
exhaust gas temperature 
electrical power distribution and control subsystem 
engine start command 
External Tank 
extravehicular activity 
flight crew equipment 
Freon coolant loop 
fuel cell powerplant 
flight control system 
fault detection and annunciation 
flash evaporator system 
flight critical forward 
Failure Identification 
fleXible reusable surface insulation 
feet per second 
Getaway Special 
Government furnished equipment 
general purpose computer memory 
Greenwich mean time 
gaseous nitrogen 
gaseous oxygen 
general purpose computer 
8-1 
GUCP 
HAINS 
HPFTP 
HPOT 
HPOTP 
IMU 
VO 
Isp 
JPL 
JSC 
KSC 
kW 
kWh 
LCC 
LED 
LESC 
LH2 
L02 
MAPS 
MAST 
MCC 
MOM 
MECO 
MET 
MILA 
MMT 
MPS 
MSBLS 
MSFC 
MTU 
NASA 
NGT 
NLGD 
nml. 
NPSP 
NSLD 
NSTS 
OMRSD 
OMS 
OPS 
PAL 
PASS 
PCA 
PGSC 
PHRR 
PLBD 
PMBT 
PRSD 
PTI 
ground umbilical carrier plate 
high accuracy Inertial navigation system 
high pressure fuel turbopump 
high pressure oxidizer turbine 
high pressure oxidizer turbopump 
inertial measurement unit 
Input/output 
specific impulse 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Johnson Space Center 
Kennedy Space Center 
kilowatt 
kilowatt hour 
Launch Commit Cnteria 
light emitting diode 
Lockheed Engineering and Science Company 
liquid hydrogen 
liquid oxygen 
Measurement of Air Pollution from Satellite 
Military Application of Ship Tracks Experiment 
Mission Control Center/main combustion chamber 
multiplexer/demultiplexer 
main engine cutoff 
mission elapsed time 
Merit Island Launch Area 
Mission Management Team 
main propulsion system 
microwave scanning beam landing system 
Marshall Space Right Center 
master timing unit 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASA Ground Terminal 
nose landing gear door 
nautical mile 
net pOSitive suction pressure 
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot 
National Space Transportation System (i.e .• Space Shuttle Program) 
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specificabons 
Document 
orbital maneuvering subsystem 
operations 
protuberance air load 
pnmary avionics software system 
power control assembly 
payload and ground support computer 
Payload High Rate Recorder 
payload bay door 
propellant mean bulk temperature 
power reactant storage and distribution 
programmed test input 
B-2 
RCS 
RM 
RMS 
RSRM 
RSS 
S&A 
SAR 
SIP 
SIR-C 
SIN 
SORG 
SRB 
SRL-2 
SRSS 
SSME 
TACAN 
TS's 
TORS 
TPS 
TUFI 
VAB' 
WCS 
WOW 
WSB 
WSGT 
X-SAR 
reactIon control subsystem 
redundancy management 
remote manipulator system 
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor 
range safety system 
safe and arm 
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
strain isolatIon pad 
Spacebome Imaging Radar 
serial number 
Shuttle OrbIter Repackaged Galley 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Space Radar Laboratory-2 
Shuttle range safety system 
Space Shuttle main engIne 
Tactical Air Navigation 
thermal barriers 
Tracking and Data Relay Satelhte 
thermal protection subsystem 
toughened uniplece surface insulation 
Vehicle Assembly Building 
Waste collection system 
weight on wheels 
water spray boiler 
WhIte Sands Ground Terminal 
X-band SynthetIC Aperture Radar 
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